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1 MODEL OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY 
 
1.1 Lignite deposit model and other assumptions 
Operation of bilateral monopoly (BM) of a power 
plant and a mine as well as the methodology of 
finding optimal solution will be shown on a simple 
example allowing on understanding of this new at-
titude (Jurdziak, 2006a). 
On a two-dimensional model of the deposit 
(Fig.1) the idea of parameterisation connected with 
the modified solution of BM (Jurdziak 2004a,b) is 
presented. It is assumed that the cost o excavation 
of one block of overburden or lignite is constant 
and equals 10 monetary units per block (Mu, is a 
multiplier of small mu e.g 1000 times or more). 
Lignite has different quality described by the qual-
ity indicator having values in range 0.5–1.0. The 
value model of the deposit (Fig.1) shows the net 
value of each block, after subtracting the cost of 
excavation from value of lignite (Jurdziak, 2000). 
It is assumed that the lignite price paid by a 
mine to a power plant is a product of the base price 
of lignite and the indicator of its quality. It is as-
sumed 
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Figure 1. The lignite deposit models: quality (above) and 
value (below). The base price of lignite is 100 Mu/block and 
cost of excavation is 10 Mu/block.  
 
that lignite with the quality indicator 1.0 has twice 
as much value (utility) for the power plant than 
those with the indicator 0.5. Lignite utility is there-
fore the cardinal one and can be measured as a 
value of electric energy generated from burned lig-
nite lowered by all costs connected with energy 
production including “ecological” costs connected 
with removal and utilization of ballast ingredients 
(e.g. ashes, sulphur). A lignite utility function is an 
individual feature characteristic to a particular 
boiler in a power plant.  
 
 
ABSTRACT: Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for 
bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is 
proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should 
select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement 
should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing 
the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excava-
tion of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in 
vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market 
using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further 
research.  
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Figure 2. Nested ultimate pits P1-P7 (lignite in P2-P7). 
 
 
In the model of deposit there are only 7 nested 
pits (P1–P7) (Fig.2) having the slope 1:1. The P7 
pit is the maximum one, which contain the whole 
available lignite in the deposit. 
In the analysis the net cash flows form nested 
pits are calculated and further processed. Here all 
and usually Lerchs-Grossmann pits generated in 
parameterisation process. This approach can be re-
placed by discounted values of excavation sched-
ules - NPV values of optimal schedules generated 
(by NPVScheduler or other similar software) for 
different lignite prices.  
1.2 Financial results of BM 
For each ultimate pit we can calculate its net 
value – assumed mine profit from excavation of 
this pit (other costs are omitted) for different lig-
nite price levels (50-170 Mu/block). Six lignite 
border prices have been calculated - the lowest lig-
nite prices for which given pits have the maximum 
value (Tab.1). For the border price (and all prices 
greater up to the next border price) this pit has the 
maximum value. The border prices can also be cal-
culated otherwise. It can be checked for which 
prices the marginal pits (MP2-MP6, Fig.3) attain 
positive values for the first time when price in-
creases. It means that for the border prices it is 
worth to increase the pit. For example marginal pit 
MP3 consists of 1 block of lignite having IQ=0.6 
and 4 blocks of overburden. The total cost of exca-
vation of all blocks is 50 Mu. So it is enough to 
check for which base price of lignite the value of 
lignite inside the marginal pit (a product of number 
of lignite blocks, the base price and the index of 
averaged quality IQ) is grater than 50 Mu. It is 
easy to check that for MP3 the border price is 
83.(3) Mu (=50Mu/0.6).  
 
Table 1. Description of pits and financial results of mine, 
power plant and bilateral monopoly. 
No
Amount 
of 
lignite
Amount of 
overburden
     
Strip 
ratio
Border 
price of 
lignite
Averaged 
quality
Mine 
profit
Power 
plant 
profit
Point 
code
Joint 
BM 
profit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lp [block] [block] [Mu/block] [Mu] [Mu] [Mu]
1 0 1 - - - -10 - - -10
2 1 3 3 80 0.5 0 22.05 A 22.05
3 2 7 3.5 83.33 0.55 1.69 44.83 B 46.52
4 3 13 4.33 100 0.6 20.09 43.3 C 63.39
5 4 21 5.25 112.5 0.65 42.63 30.05 D 72.68
6 5 31 6.2 122.22 0.7 67.88 6.5 E 74.37
7 6 43 7.17 130 0.75 95.23 -26.75 F 68.48  
1 – following numbers of nested pits P1-P7, 
5 – the lowest lignite price for which the given pit has the 
maximum value, 
7 – The net value of the pit, sum of non-discounting cash 
flows from the mine 
)( nwbwwwk qqkIQqp +−=Π  (1) 
where: Πk = mine profit, [Mu], pw = base price of lignite 
which is optimal for the given power plant, [Mu/block], qw = 
amount of lignite, [block], IQw = quality indicator of aver-
aged lignite, qwIQw = equivalent amount of base lignite, kb = 
cost of excavation of one block of overburden or lignite, 
[Mu/block], qn = amount of overburden, [block]. 
8 – power plant profit from selling electricity generated from 
burning lignite contained inside the pit: 
wwwee IQqcpcp )( 21 −−=Π  (2) 
where Πe = power plant profit, [Mu], pe = price of electricity 
unit (eu), [Mu/eu], qw = amount of lignite, [block], c1=const 
amount of energy generated from one block of base lignite 
[eu/block], c2=const cost of transformation of one block of 
base lignite into electric energy [Mu/block ]. 
9 – description of points having two coordinates: mine profit 
and power plant profit for a given border lignite price (Fig.6),  
10 – sum of mine and power plant profits. 
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Figure 3. Marginal ultimate pits MP2- MP7. 
 
Besides value of pits (1) in Table 1 are shown 
also profits of power plant from processing lignite 
contained inside nested pits (2).  
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Figure 4. Profits of mine, power plant and BM. 
 
 
It has been assumed that:  
• the electricity price is stable and equals 
0.13 mu/eu, 
• effectiveness of lignite transformation into 
electricity is proportional to index of its quality, 
• power plant costs are similar to costs in mine in 
order to keep approximate 50% share in costs 
of electricity production.  
The optimal base price of lignite maximising 
joint profits of BM is 122.(2) Mu/block and the P6 
pit is the best for the mine – it has the highest 
value. Joint BM profits for all prices between 
122.(2) and 130 Mu/block are constant. Excavation 
of the P7 pit is not profitable for BM. In spite of 
greater mine profits (95.23 Mu) joint BM profits 
are smaller than for the P6 pit (Fig.4). It can be 
seen that joint BM profits are not lignite price 
varying. Improvements in financial results of BM 
should be therefore found in the optimal adjust-
ment of shape and size of the ultimate pit into elec-
tricity demand (its prices) than in the prolonged 
negotiation of lignite prices. The lignite price de-
cides only about profit division between both sides 
and do not improve joint results. 
Profits for all elements of BM have been calcu-
lated for the established electricity price. It is 
worth therefore to check how the changes of this 
price influence the level of BM profits. They are 
presented as a consequence of pit selection and the 
electricity price (Fig.5). It can be seen that for dif-
ferent prices different pits maximise joint profits. 
Such analysis is important in order to realize that 
mine tying up to one particular design and one 
schedule of its development can sometimes lower 
joint profits. After changes of economic conditions 
or cost structure the optimisation process should be 
carried once again in order to find out if the best 
solution is still realised. If not the mine should ad-
just the ultimate pit and schedule to new situation. 
Such adjustment can be treated as a real option to 
change the scale of operation. 
Such analysis can be helpful in improvement of 
joint results of integrating vertically firms such as 
BOT „Gornictwo i energetyka” S.A. - the holding 
of 3 power plants and 2 mines. In case of separate 
entities with different owners the own gains of one 
or both sides can be more important than joint re-
sults (Jurdziak, 2005a,b). Analysis of power game 
in such situations is the subject of further analysis.  
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Figure 5. Financial results as a 2D function of electricity 
prices (0.1-0.15 mu/eu) and ultimate pits (P2-P7). Continu-
ous approximation (left side) and discrete solution (right). 
2 LIGNITE PRICE NEGOTIATION AND 
GAME THEORY 
2.1 Solution of BM as a positive-sum game 
Bilateral monopoly (BM) of a mine and a power 
plant and their mutual relation (especially negotia-
tion of lignite supply and its prices) can be treated 
as a game. Both sides consider different strategies 
(selection the ultimate pit and lignite price) and 
want to maximise their utility which can be identi-
fied with financial their results.  
Interests of both sides in this game are not com-
pletely opposed, due to cooperation can bring 
maximisation of joint profits through selection of 
the optimal pit based on outcomes of L-G pit opti-
misation, the BM model and the forecasts of de-
mand for electricity (their prices) in long run 
(Jurdziak 2004a, b). The negotiation between mine 
and power plant can not be therefore treated as a 
zero-sum game. If cooperation can improve results 
the game has positive but variable sum. 
2.2 The polygon of acceptable payoffs 
The payoffs polygon for the mine can be con-
structed using data from Table 1. The method of 
border prices determination shows that it is profit-
able for the mine to excavate the given pit if the 
lignite price is placed between the border price cal-
culated for this pit and the border price for the next 
one (bigger). The mine can excavate particular pit 
getting other prices for lignite – between the prices 
determining break even points for mine and for 
power plant (e.g.102.9-124.1 Mu/block for the P6 
pit) still having profits. However if the lignite price 
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is outside the border prices interval it is better for 
the mine to excavate the different pit due to this 
brings the mine higher profits. 
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Figure 6.The polygon of acceptable by BM payoffs and lines 
of the stable BM profits (x+y=const) for all pits together with 
lignite price contours and prices of lignite determined by 
break even points for the mine (Y) and the power plant (X ). 
 
The sum of mine and power plant profits is con-
stant due to joint profits of BM depends on elec-
tricity prices and selection of the pit (Fig.5) and are 
independent of lignite prices (Fig.4). All points 
corresponding to strategies of excavation of the 
particular pit with different lignite prices are 
placed on the one line x+y=const, going through 
the point determined by the border price for this 
pit.  
For each lignite price the mine has the predomi-
nant strategy – the excavation of the L-G optimal 
pit for this price. It gives mine the highest profit. 
Other pits for this price gives smaller profits, so as 
dominated strategies should be excluded (Fig.7). 
On the basis of the predominant strategy the poly-
gon of acceptable solutions for the mine can be 
constructed. It is an area of polygon determined by 
points representing payoffs in optimal strategies 
(points A, B, C , D, E in Tab.1) and their projec-
tions on lines lying below (points A’, B’, C’, D’, 
E’ on Fig.6). The sum of intervals: AA’, BB’, CC’, 
DD’ and EE’ represents predominant pure strate-
gies. 
The line lying furthest to the right (going 
through the point E) represents the ultimate pit 
which brings the highest profit to BM for the given 
electricity price. From the point of view of joint 
profit maximisation the optimal pit is P6. It gives 
the joint profit 74.37 Mu. The lowest lignite price, 
which brings the mine the biggest profit from ex-
cavation P6 pit, is 122.2 Mu/block. With lower 
price, between 112.5 and 122.2 Mu/block, the mine 
can attain higher profits excavating the P5 pit.  
Unfortunately in a two-person, positive-sum 
games the conflict of group rationality (maximisa-
tion of joint profit) with the individual one (maxi-
misation of own profit) can appear. It takes place 
in analysed situation. Division of profit in excava-
tion of the P6 pit is unequal. In the best case (under 
the lowest price 122.(2) Mu/block) the power plant 
attains profit 6.50 Mu and the mine 67.9 Mu (10 
times greater) (Fig.6). Such unequal division can 
enhance on side to choose the solution, which is 
not optimal in Pareto sense. Individual rationality 
and opportunism sometimes can win. Such solution 
can not be acknowledge as a proper one due to 
only the outcome which is Pareto optimal can be 
accepted as the game solution (Straffin 2004).  
In the analysed example only the excavation of 
the pit P6 is the Pareto optimal strategy (line 
x+y=74.37, Fig.6). This pit can be profitable exca-
vated when lignite prices are between 
102.9 Mu/block (break even point for the mine, 
x=0) and 124.1 Mu/block (break even point for the 
power plant, y=0). Due to only in a small area 
(122.2-124.1 Mu/block) line of the maximum BM 
profit covers the polygon of acceptable for mine 
payoffs it would be better for attaining compromise 
to separate the lignite price negotiation from the 
selection of the optimal pit and conduct negotia-
tions in two stages. 
2.3 Negotiation as cooperative, two-stages, two-
person, non zero-sum game 
In the first stage (strictly cooperative) based on the 
disclosed cost data, outcomes of parameterisation 
process of lignite deposit (using L-G optimisation), 
and forecasts of future demand for electricity (level 
of its future prices) both sides should select the op-
timal ultimate pit which maximises joint BM prof-
its. The pit can be selected using methods de-
scribed in (Jurdziak, 2004a, b) or graphically by 
creating the mine and power plant payoffs polygon 
(Fig.6). The first stage would be the two-person, 
non-zero sum game, which target is the selection of 
the optimal ultimate pit.  
Only during the second stage, if the division of 
profit implicated by the optimal solution (here 
6.5 Mu for the power plant and 67.9 Mu for the 
mine) is not accepted by one of BM sides, both of 
them can take the decision to split the profit differ-
ently. This new profit division can be realised by: 
• side payments in order to eliminate too big 
differences in profit shares or attain other 
accepted division of profit or 
• establishing the different lignite price (trans-
fer price) for mutual clearing off their ac-
counts. In such a case both the ultimate pit 
selection and other decisions regarding 
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changes of pit size and shape should be done 
using optimal lignite price calculated for the 
modified BM model in order to keep eco-
nomic effectiveness and rationality of deci-
sions. The profit division using lignite trans-
fer price requires deep cooperation and is 
more probably in firms vertically integrated 
or in holdings. 
2.4 Threat of non cooperative behaviour and 
opportunism 
In order to avoid negative behaviours connected 
with non-cooperative attitude and opportunism in 
this stage of the game (implicated by completely 
opposed interests) it is worth to build negotiation 
on the rational foundation and in advance decide 
about the fair profit division. Such division should 
be built in formula price contracts (Blair & Kaser-
mann, 1987) in order to avoid frequent renegotia-
tions after any changes of key factors having influ-
ence on the optimal solution. Frequent and 
repetitive negotiations increase transactional costs 
and the forced adoption of unfair profit division 
can lead to changes on other ground. One way is 
the cost increase of other services offered by mine 
to power plant (e.g. ash dumping in the pit). What 
can be treated as the side payments extortion in the 
retaliation for lowering lignite prices. Much more 
dangerous however is resignation by the mine from 
excavation of the optimal pit maximising joint BM 
profits in aid of excavation of the pit which maxi-
mises only own profits of the mine. The mine will 
definitely select the smaller pit with lower amount 
of lignite what shorten life of the mine and the 
power plant and lower the electric energy supply in 
long run. Not mention about lowering power plant 
profits what should be obvious. 
The full control of the mine activity can be se-
cured only by the full vertical integration 
(Jurdziak, 2005a, b).  
2.5 The predominant strategy of the mine and the 
asymmetry of information 
On Figure 7 the profits of the mine and the 
power plant are presented in slightly different form 
– as a function of lignite price. The predominant 
strategy of the mine creates the broken line from 
intervals of linear mine profits for particular ulti-
mate pits. It is the continuous, monotonically in-
creasing function in area of all accepted lignite 
prices from the lowest allowing on profitable exca-
vation of the deposit (here 80 Mu/block), up to the 
highest price accepted by power plant – determin-
ing its break even point (here 124.1 Mu/block). 
The power plant profits are not continuous and are 
only monotonically decreasing within intervals 
with jumps in border prices depicted changes of 
the pit in the predominant strategy of the mine. 
This means that the power plant can not draw its 
long run profit function without knowledge, which 
pits are profitable for the mine to be excavated for 
given lignite prices. The selection of the ultimate 
pit (its size and shape) by the optimisation program 
determines the amount and quality of available lig-
nite and revenues and costs of power plant . 
The mine has an information advantage over 
power plant – it knows the deposit and can conduct 
its optimisation generating a series of nested ulti-
mate pits and price intervals for their profitable ex-
cavation. Such knowledge is not available in the 
power plant what worsens its position during nego-
tiation. This asymmetry of information in condition 
of free market (domination criteria and individual 
rationality) can threaten power plant interests. The 
mine always increases own gains by increasing the 
lignite price. The power plant lowering the lignite 
price never knows if this increases or decreases its 
long run profits. For example by the decreasing of 
lignite price below 100 Mu/block power plant prof-
its decreases about 15 Mu, what is the contradic-
tion with expectations. Tendency to vertical inte-
gration of mine and power plant is therefore 
profoundly natural and even desired. It liquidates 
risk and uncertainty and gives the integrated en-
ergy producer full control over mining activity.  
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Figure 7.Profits of mine, power plant and BM as a function 
of lignite prices. The continuous line represents power plant 
profits for the predominant strategy of the mine.  
3 CONCLUSIONS 
Utilization of the BM model and methods of pit 
optimisation allows on treatment of lignite price 
negotiation between mine and power plant in long 
term contracts as the cooperative, two-stage, two 
person, non zero-sum game. Due to improvement 
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in economic results should be found in the optimal 
adjustment of shape and size of the ultimate pit to 
electric energy demand and not in the prolonged 
negotiations of lignite price the game should be 
carried in two stages. In the first one (cooperative) 
both sides should select the ultimate pit maximis-
ing joint profits of the whole system. Only in the 
second stage (a competitive one), after a settlement 
is obtained regarding acceptable profit division, it 
can be realised through selection of a proper trans-
fer price of lignite. So the problem of choosing ap-
propriate transfer price would be only a technical 
one. It should be stressed that the agreed and ac-
cepted split of profit would determine the transfer 
price and not the other way round. This stage 
would be the positive-sum game (if the sum is con-
stant it is identical with zero-sum game) in which 
the sum is equal to maximal profit ΠVmax.  
Analysis of this game leads to conclusion that 
only full vertical integration of both firms can se-
cure realisation of optimal solution maximising 
joint BM profits. Existence of information asym-
metry – mine predominance implicated by deposit 
knowledge, can in competitive attitude of both 
sides and concentration only on the lignite price 
negotiation lead to suboptimal solutions – not ef-
fective in Pareto sense. The mine for each lignite 
price level can choose the predominant strategy 
(maximising their own payoffs) relying upon selec-
tion of the optimal ultimate pit. Usually it will be a 
smaller pit than the pit optimal for the whole BM. 
This lowers the joint profits; shorten the time of 
lignite excavation and lower the deposit utilization 
rate.  
Presented procedure of the optimal ultimate pit 
selection maximising joint BM profits can be used 
for the optimal mineable lignite reserves determi-
nation based on economic criteria connected both 
with the mine and the power plant as well as with 
the electric energy market.  
The open matter, requiring further research, is 
fair profit division that is finding the solution for 
the second stage of the game. It seems that applica-
tion of Nash bargaining solution should be helpful 
(Jurdziak, 2006b in press). 
Another problem is the transition from long run 
and strategic decisions connected with selection of 
optimal pit into day-to-day relations of both sides 
operating as separate entities or within the verti-
cally integrated energy producer (Jurdziak, 2005a, 
b).  
It seems that the short-term solutions should be 
placed within LOM Plan of the BM development 
but simultaneously it should be adjustable to short-
term electricity demand changes in order to allow 
on taking advantage of electricity price increases. 
It can be done through optimisation of short-term 
schedules – appropriate selection of BWE capaci-
ties on different levels and proper sequencing of 
excavation from different faces for optimal blend-
ing (Kawalec, 2004). Liberalization of energy mar-
kets requires more dynamic management of energy 
supply so more dynamic should be also manage-
ment of lignite supply from mines to power plants. 
Now there are available software solutions which 
link long and short term scheduling (e.g. Mine2-
4D) what should be helpful in the dynamic and op-
timal management of excavation. Integration of 
such methods with the economic model of BM op-
eration on the basis of game theory and their valua-
tion using real options is the new proposal for lig-
nite mines and power plants. 
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